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Abstract: An expansive, worldwide smallpox eradication programme
(SEP) was announced by the World Health Assembly in 1958, leading
this decision-making body to instruct the World Health Organization
Headquarters in Geneva to work with WHO regional offices to engage
and draw in national governments to ensure success. Tabled by the
Soviet Union’s representative and passed by a majority vote by member
states, the announcement was subject to intense diplomatic negotiations.
This led to the formation, expansion and reshaping of an ambitious
and complex campaign that cut across continents and countries. This
article examines these inter-twining international, regional and national
processes, and challenges long-standing historiographical assumptions
about the fight against smallpox only gathering strength from the
mid-1960s onwards, after the start of a US-supported programme
in western Africa. The evidence presented here suggests a far more
complex picture. It shows that although the SEP’s structures grew slowly
between 1958 and 1967, a worldwide eradication programme resulted
from international negotiations made possible through gains during
this period. Significant progress in limiting the incidence of smallpox
sustained international collaboration, and justified the prolongation and
expansion of activities. Indeed, all of this bore diplomatic and legal
processes within the World Health Assembly and WHO that acted
as the foundation of the so-called intensified phase of the SEP and
the multi-faceted activities that led to the certification of smallpox
eradication in 1980.
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The World Health Assembly (WHA) of May 1980 hosted the celebrations of the
worldwide eradication of naturally occurring smallpox. Caused by the variola virus, the
disease had been striking different corners of the globe in regular epidemic cycles, and
an international commission of experts met in Geneva in December 1979 to confirm
its disappearance in nature. This certification had been justified with the help of data
generated through an intensive, two-year long worldwide search for naturally occurring
smallpox, after what turned out to be the last recorded case in 1977 inside Somalia.1
Celebrations of such successes are generally balanced on hagiographic references to the
past and this event was no different. The achievement of smallpox eradication was linked
to Edward Jenner’s 1796 discovery of an early version of a smallpox vaccine, even if there
was extremely little in common between it and the great variety of vaccinal products,
immunological understandings, epidemiological concepts, administrative innovations and
societal interventions that had underpinned the worldwide fight against variola. The
celebrations also began to manufacture exclusionary myths, built on the privileging
of certain projects and their managers over the work of other actors. The resultant
narratives generally ignored the longer histories of smallpox vaccination around the world
throughout the twentieth century, as well as the influence of discussion, disagreement
and accommodation between the World Health Organization’s Headquarters (WHO HQ)
in Geneva, its regional offices and their member states in creating a multi-faceted
programme.2 This article shows that it is more beneficial to adopt a different frame for
the study of smallpox eradication.
Interrogating Multiple Historiographies
It would be fair to say that existing institutional histories, participant autobiographies
and biographies, and academic studies of worldwide smallpox eradication have generally
failed to provide us with nuanced assessments of the many organised efforts to improve
and widen smallpox surveillance and vaccination work across Latin America and Asia
during the 1950s and early 1960s. For example, official histories prepared or sponsored
by the US Centers of Disease Control (CDC) propose a very distinctive historical and
temporal frame, which argues that innovations by officials in western and central Africa,
from the mid-1960s onwards, were central to the Smallpox Eradication Programme’s
(SEP’s) worldwide success.3 This is a narrative describing how relatively small groups
of US actors moved from one national context to another, all acting in seemingly uniform
ways and spreading a core wisdom supposedly developed by a handful of visionaries that
then acted as the driver for worldwide smallpox eradication.4 Herein, the embrace of these
1 World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox: Final Report of the Global Commission for
the Certification of Smallpox Eradication, Geneva, December 1979 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1980),
56–60.
2 World Health Organization, Thirty-Third World Health Assembly: Verbatim Records of Plenary Meetings
Reports of Committees (Geneva: WHO, 1980), 157.
3 Horace G. Ogden, CDC and The Smallpox Crusade (Washington DC: US Department of Health and Human
Services, Centers for Disease Control, 1987).
4 The lack of attention paid to diversity, in terms of gender and race, in these historical explications is quite
staggering, even when roles played by US nationals in the SEP through the CDC, wider US government and
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supposedly infallible precepts by national and local actors in developing countries, who
usually only get fleeting mentions, becomes a civilisational marker. That is, evidence of
the existence of scientific sensibilities and abilities among members of African and Asian
national workforces, who CDC consultants were then able to marshal effectively and
engineer the victory against smallpox.5 A grand diffusionist narrative, this is a tale of how
a body of thought within a supposedly monolithic public health agency in the mid-1960s
would go on to educate everyone else in the world between 1967 and 1977. It is noteworthy
how little this formulation has shifted in narratives that involve ex-CDC actors, even as it
has found new avenues of propagation in recent years. For example, the online Global
Chronicles archival project is remarkable in its exclusivity in selecting interviewees from
within and outside the CDC, even as it presumes to equate the subjective memories of the
relative few with a ‘global’ perspective about an extremely complex international public
health programme involving hundreds of thousands of workers from countries around the
world.6 Such positivist narratives, highlighting the excellence and impact of the select few,
continue to live through similarly exclusionary participant autobiographies that generally
remain reliant on selective memory and nostalgia. Such work is rarely marked by self-
criticality or humility, and is usually completely disengaged from detailed research with
swathes of official correspondence available in WHO and government archives, which
detail a range of strengths and frailties within all agencies involved in delivering the SEP.7
Even though the WHO HQ’s official history, Smallpox and its Eradication, published
in 1988, is distinct from the CDC’s offerings, it has also been influential in presenting
a very specific SEP timeline.8 This narrative privileges the work carried out between
1967 and 1977, presenting this so-called intensified phase of action as absolutely central
to eradication. Therefore, the geographic regions where these activities were carried
out receive maximum attention, and this goes hand in hand with the production of a
constricted history of earlier efforts and the regions where these were delivered. Written
by several SEP stalwarts, including Donald A. Henderson and Isao Arita, who headed
the Smallpox Eradication Unit within the WHO HQ at different points of time, and
Frank Fenner, who chaired the international eradication certification committee, its detail-
heavy nature hides a number of ills. It is based on a selective use of a rich corpus
of unpublished materials dealing with the SEP available in the WHO HQ’s archives.9
WHO structures are examined. A most prominent example of this is the relative lack of detailed assessment of
the work, negotiations and perspectives provided by major African–American actors like Dr George I. Lythcott, a
physician who was the regional lead of the USAID-supported west and central Africa programme, which involved
twenty countries and complex negotiations with the governments of each. Female, African–American physicians
like Dr Margaret Grigsby, who acted as a CDC consultant in the African campaign, get the odd mention, but
their views do not get any sustained historical consideration either. Dr Donald R. Hopkins, who was involved
in the SEP and involved in leading current efforts to eradicate guinea worm, appears to be an exception to the
trends, possibly because he is an accomplished communicator. See, Donald R. Hopkins, Princes and Peasants:
Smallpox in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).
5 See, for example, David, J. Sencer, William H. Foege and James O. Mason, ‘Foreword’, in Ogden, op. cit.
(note 3), ix–x.
6 See, ‘Global Health Chronicles: Smallpox’ at: https://www.globalhealthchronicles.org/smallpox-eradication
(accessed 1 November 2018).
7 For example, see William Foege, House on Fire: The Fight to Eradicate Smallpox (California: University of
California Press, 2012).
8 Frank Fenner et al., Smallpox and its Eradication (Geneva: The World Health Organization, 1988).
9 Donald Ainslie Henderson joined the Smallpox Eradication Unit in the WHO HQ Geneva in November 1966,
serving as its chief till 1977. Isao Arita, who had joined WHO as an epidemiologist in 1962, succeeded him,
serving between 1977 and 1985. Fenner, ibid., iv.
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Few academic histories have openly recognised that this publication combines the authors’
own subjectivities with many intricate political negotiations within WHO frameworks and
the governments of all countries described within it. Highlighting the roles played mainly
by WHO representatives, this was, by no means, a comprehensive assessment of the great
diversities of field-level experiments and innovations; it is largely a narrative about the top-
down imposition of ideas for successful eradication. The book is, in essence, a diplomatic
exercise that seeks to explain how finite sets of ideas allowed international and national
actors, largely brought together by the WHO HQ, to expunge variola. That Smallpox and
its Eradication does not present us with value-free sets of information on which there
was wide-ranging agreement is proven by the wider body of work penned by its authors.
For example, interpretative differences over timelines and the strategic worth of specific
actors are clearly visible when one compares the biographies of Isao Arita and Donald
Henderson. Both books refer to the work carried out across the world before 1967 only
briefly. However, there are important terminological and analytical differences about what
happened before the so-called intensification of the SEP. Arita recollects his experiences
as a field epidemiologist in western Africa, where he refers to his visits to Mali, Nigeria,
Afghanistan and Burma, and notes the existence of active national smallpox eradication
initiatives. He labels these activities as the preparatory phase of the worldwide SEP.10
Henderson, by contrast, claims that the worldwide SEP struggled until US intervention
from the mid-1960s, underpinned by President Lyndon Johnson’s political and financial
commitments.11 There are other notable differences in the narratives as well. For example,
there is a disjuncture between their descriptions of the attitude of Dr Marcolino Candau,
the WHO Director-General (WHO DG) at the time the SEP was formally announced
by the WHA in 1958 (and who remained in post till 1973). Arita highlights Candau’s
defence of the goal of smallpox eradication in a WHO Executive Board (EB) meeting in
1966, describing a process where he fought for the strengthening of the SEP’s interlinked
national chapters.12 For Henderson, this WHO DG was someone who opposed smallpox
eradication, manoeuvring behind the scenes to derail the programme.13
Critical assessments of such interpretational dissonances in institutional and participant
histories is substantially lacking in academic scholarship. This is perhaps explicable due
to the Anglophone-centric research base of much of the available work, which is marked
by a tendency to mainly ascribe value in relation to the creation of ideas and delivery of
health programmes to English-speaking actors. However, scholarly biases also seem driven
by factors other than the choice of lingua franca of communication of historical actors.
This is visible in the stubborn tendency to avoid careful engagement with the papers and
writings of prominent non-US and non-European actors, even when bodies of such work
are made available in English. There is, for instance, a remarkable inability to consider
Isao Arita’s published thoughts, retrospective or otherwise, even though he was the chief
of the WHO HQ’s Smallpox Eradication Unit in the run-up to the formal certification
of eradication (his biography being a good example). Such historical scholarship is
often founded on received presumptions, where academics have generally focused on the
opinion and actions of a handful of US participants, believing only that they were able
10 Isao Arita, The Smallpox Eradication Saga: An Insider’s View (Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan Private Limited,
2010), prologue xvii.
11 Donald A. Henderson, Smallpox: The Death of a Disease (New York: Prometheus Books, 2009), 61–74.
12 Arita, op. cit. (note 10), 5–6, 18.
13 Henderson, op. cit. (note 11), 58, 65.
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to play meaningful international roles. Ideas of exclusivity in relation to SEP design and
delivery are promoted by the unquestioning adoption of claims and timelines presented by
representatives of institutions such as the CDC. Such historical work then emphasises the
centrality of US influences throughout the SEP, starting with President Lyndon Johnson’s
public announcement of support for a measles and smallpox vaccination programme in
western and central Africa. Such an explanatory frame is visible in Bob Reinhardt’s book,
where the WHA’s formal support in 1958 for smallpox eradication gets a fleeting mention,
but there is no recognition or analysis of its almost immediate international impact (for
example, in the shape of the influential WHA Resolution 12.54 passed in 1959).14 Such
selectivity in research then appears to lead to the SEP’s intensified phase being described
as an extension of the USA’s Cold War battlefields.15
More rounded and critical work on US engagements with the SEP is provided by
Erez Manela. Here, retrospective imaginations of involvement in the programme are
carefully unpicked and programmatic successes are attributed to ‘US funds and expertise
with the Soviet capacity for vaccine production’.16 Anne-Emanuelle Birn uses a similar
formulation, declaring that the combination of American epidemiological expertise and a
Soviet vaccine were the key drivers of the SEP, even as she argues that smallpox presented
an odd choice for eradication in 1966.17 Paul Greenough has given us an original and well-
researched study of CDC officials working on smallpox epidemiology in East Pakistan in
the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, this scholarship does not contain an assessment
of how data collected from these initiatives connected to the work of WHO representatives
given the responsibility for mobilising support for the newly launched SEP.18 An attendant
historiographical narrative fuels the exclusionary approaches to the history of the SEP. A
well-established body of scholarship has continued to favour what is best labelled a step-
by-step approach to the study of international programmes involving the WHO, which
is generally presumed to be equivalent to its Geneva-based HQ. This work promotes the
argument that one campaign followed another, with minimal or no overlap; so, in such
narratives, malaria eradication came first, followed by the fight against smallpox and that
this was then succeeded by the advocacy of primary health care.19 This presentational
device, in turn, manufactures constrained timeframes for each initiative, justifying their
supposedly self-contained nature. All these narratives come together to provide us with
a narrow understanding of the SEP, which is equated with the so-called intensified phase
that was put into place in the latter half of the 1960s, after the completion of United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and CDC-supported work in western and
central Africa. By highlighting the significance of the Cold War at the expense of other
political movements and alliances, this body of work also combines to create silences
14 Bob H. Reinhardt, The End of a Global Pox: America and the Eradication of Smallpox in the Cold War Era
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 21, 38.
15 Reinhardt, ibid., 49.
16 Erez Manela, ‘A Pox on your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History’, Diplomatic History,
34, 2 (2010), 300–3.
17 Anne-Emanuelle Birn, ‘Small(pox) Success?’, Ciencia & Saude Coletiva, 16, 2 (2011), 598.
18 Paul Greenough, ‘A Wild and Wondrous Ride: CDC Field Epidemiologists in the East Pakistan Smallpox and
Cholera Epidemics of 1958’, Ciencia e Saude Coletiva, 16, 2 (2011), 491–500.
19 See, for example, Randall Packard, A History of Global Health: Interventions into the Lives of Other Peoples
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016) and Nancy Leys Stepan, Eradication: Ridding the World of
Diseases Forever? (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011).
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about the extended history, great geographical spread and the significant impact of what
Isao Arita has called the SEP’s preparatory phase in the 1950s and early 1960s.20
A body of more inclusive scholarship, which recognises the value of the voices of
a wider range of actors in the worldwide SEP, also exists. This scholarship, generally
speaking, examines how national political priorities influenced their own engagement
with regional and international efforts. Paul Greenough’s path-breaking article about
the use of force, and wide-ranging and frequently powerful nature of resistance in
South Asia, pioneered work that consciously shifted away from narrow, heroic narratives
of the programme.21 We have Gilberto Hochman’s fine-grained research about Brazil,
which details how the national authorities ignored smallpox during the fifties even
though the WHO Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) had launched a continental
eradication effort in 1950. According to Hochman, the situation changed during the sixties,
following a chain of events that made the Brazilian central government more interested
in international partnerships. Hochman reveals how some national representatives took
advantage of the new political developments in Latin America, especially the work
of Juscelino Kubitschek with the so-called Alliance for Progress, to bring smallpox
to the forefront of national health agenda at the outset of the 1960s. These impulses
would go on to get support from an unexpected source: a military government that
came to power after a coup in 1964, which was keen to get international recognition
and a national smallpox eradication campaign provided such an opportunity.22 Sanjoy
Bhattacharya’s case studies of independent India assess the complexity of its national
and local governments’ engagements with WHO officials seeking to promote the interests
of the worldwide SEP in the 1960s and 1970s. Highlighting complex fragmentations
and alliances within governmental and WHO structures, he presents us with descriptions
of intricate networks of international, national and district-level public health workers
with varying loyalties and, therefore, strategic approaches.23 Bhattacharya reveals how
overseas workers and, by implication, the political interests they represented struggled
to dictate any terms to Indian central and state governments, which kept a firm grip on
pilot investigations as well as subsequent mass vaccination and search and immunisation
practices (including the work carried out in the kingdom of Bhutan).24 Vivek Neelakantan
provides a carefully researched assessment of the challenges of ridding Indonesia, a
multi-island nation, of smallpox. In this, he presents us with detailed descriptions of
programmatic specificities across complex political and social structures, as well as the
national and international collaborations that underpinned successes.25 However, this work
does not contain a detailed assessment of the intricate international exchanges and deals
underpinning the design, expansion and workings of the first stage of the SEP between
1958 and 1967, which is provided in the following sections.
20 Arita, op. cit. (note 10), xvii.
21 Paul Greenough, ‘Intimidation, Coercion and Resistance in the Final Stages of the South Asian Smallpox
Eradication Campaign, 1973–75’, Social Science and Medicine, 41, 5 (1995), 633–45.
22 Gilberto Hochman, ‘Priority, Invisibility and Eradication: The History of Smallpox and the Brazilian Public
Health Agenda’, Medical History, 53, 2 (2009), 240–4.
23 Sanjoy Bhattacharya, Expunging Variola: The Control and Eradication of Smallpox in India, 1947–77 (New
Delhi: Orient Longman, 2006).
24 Sanjoy Bhattacharya, ‘International Health and the Limits of its Global Influence: Bhutan and the Worldwide
Smallpox Eradication Programme’,Medical History, 57, 4 (2013), 461–86.
25 Vivek Neelakantan, ‘Eradicating Smallpox in Indonesia: The Archipelagic Challenge’, Health History, 12, 1
(2010), 61–87.
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Founding the Worldwide Smallpox Eradication Programme
It is important to remember that the first WHA of 1948, held in Geneva, identified smallpox
as one of the public health priorities requiring attention from the new international
collective brought together by WHO frameworks. To this purpose, WHA Resolution 1.16
was prepared and opened up for a vote; a majority mandate resulted, indicating that
there was general support for organised action against this disease, which was a major
concern especially within decolonising countries in what would soon become the WHO’s
South East Asia Region (the regional office, WHO SEARO, was formed the same year).
This WHA decision caused the WHO Expert Committee on International Epidemiology
and Quarantine to form a dedicated study group to assess the impact and control of
smallpox, and this body worked to ensure that these issues remained visible within
WHO structures worldwide. As news about the large-scale production of new, effective
and freeze-dried smallpox vaccines circulated within health agencies, the disease stood
out among other communicable diseases as a potentially solvable problem. In 1950, the
committee overseeing the PAHO (theWHO regional office for the Americas), voted to start
regional smallpox eradication efforts.26 In the same year, the third WHA recommended,
through Resolution 3.18, which was passed through with the help of another majority vote,
that more weight should be given to smallpox control in the WHO’s regular programme
and budget. In 1953, Dr Brock Chisholm, then WHO DG, proposed a worldwide smallpox
eradication campaign and this was considered within the sixthWHA, whereWHOmember
states combined to recommend that WHO regional offices, national governments and
members of WHO expert advisory groups study the issue collaboratively.27 Chisholm
presented the results of the consultations to the thirteenth meeting of the WHO HQ’s
Executive Board (EB) in early 1954. The results were discouraging to those seeking more
ambitious and organised action against smallpox. Reporting on the meeting and the seventh
WHA that followed it, Dr Melville Douglas Mackenzie, a British WHO EBmember, noted
that ‘opinion was by no means unanimous for a campaign at the present time, as would be
noted from the views expressed by the various regional committees [the bodies that the new
WHO regional offices reported to]’.28 Even though the French delegate had support when
he noted that there had been progress in reducing smallpox incidence through organised
mass vaccination campaigns, representatives from other countries doubted that eradication
was technically feasible; they asked why some countries continued to have endemic
smallpox despite the existence of major vaccination drives.29 Significantly, however, these
disagreements did not result in the abandonment of plans for a campaign aiming to rid the
world of the disease. There was still sufficient synergy within the WHA to argue for more
research into future smallpox eradication strategies, and national governments were urged
to keep up mass immunisation work as part of their general public health programmes.30
26 Pan American Health Organization, Document OSP.CE7.W-15, Documents of the Seventh Meeting of the
Executive Committee, Washington DC, 1949 (Washington DC: Pan American Health Organization, 1949).
27 World Health Organization, Official Records of the World Health Organization No. 48 (Geneva: WHO, 1953),
211–15.
28 World Health Organization, Official Records of the World Health Organization No. 55 (Geneva: WHO, 1954),
208.
29 Ibid., 209.
30 For summaries and text of WHA and EB resolutions about smallpox, see The Final Report of the Global
Commission for the Certification of Smallpox Eradication, Geneva 1979 in collection A33/3 WHO/SE/79.152,
Annexe 4, File 844, Box 0001 A, World Health Organization Smallpox Eradication Archives [WHO/SEA].
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Four years later, at the eleventh WHA, held in the US city of Minneapolis in May 1958,
the Soviet Union’s delegation, led by Dr Victor Zhdanov, tabled a resolution urging
smallpox eradication.31 This called for a five-year worldwide SEP, initially directed at
countries where the disease was endemic. To rally support, the USSR offered to donate
twenty-five million doses of freeze-dried vaccines.32 This proposal received a majority
vote, which Nancy Stepan attributes to a general keenness to welcome the USSR back
into formal WHO membership (the country and several of its Warsaw Pact allies had
left this UN agency in 1948).33 A careful assessment of published and unpublished
WHO papers, such as those relating to behind the scenes negotiations between officials,
reveals a significantly more complex picture. The Soviet representatives made their case
by describing how the USSR had eliminated smallpox throughout the country in the
1930s with the help of compulsory vaccination and the use of heat-stable, freeze-dried
vaccine, which had allowed for effective immunisation even in warm and subtropical
climatic conditions. At the same time, Soviet negotiators were brutally honest about their
subsequent failures, pointing out that they had been unable to stop importations from
neighbouring countries with endemic smallpox, despite great investment into structure for
disease surveillance, containment and prevention. Therefore, they presented worldwide
smallpox eradication as the only way for governments to reduce the great outlays of
money and people needed to protect their populations. The Soviet resolution for such
a comprehensive SEP then proposed the running of mass immunisation campaigns with
effective vaccines in all smallpox endemic countries for five years, even though it admitted
that eradication was likely to take at least a decade. This report from the USSR also
suggested that the WHO share costs of purchasing vaccine and building the necessary
teams with national governments.34
When one researches the Soviet proposal’s provenance, and looks at the negotiations
that attended the creation of different drafts, it is obvious that it was unveiled at the WHA
after considerable diplomatic preparation and exchange, usually carried out behind closed
doors; these complex processes have not been recognised, researched and contextualised
in the existing scholarship dealing with the SEP. The USSR government shared the
first version with supporters within the WHO HQ’s bureaucracy on 6 March 1958,
recommending to the WHO DG that he create a special section within the WHO
HQ’s Department of Advisory Services to support member states with smallpox control.
Interestingly, while there was general support for the upcoming WHA resolution within
the WHO HQ, the Soviet recommendation was taken out from the final version tabled on
6 June 1958.35 The USSR’s proposals received detailed consideration during the fifteenth
and sixteenth sessions of the influential WHO Committee on Programme and Budget, held
on 11–12 June 1958, and involved senior WHO HQ and regional office representatives.
The suggested plans for action were unanimously accepted. Delegates from Ecuador and
the Netherlands even declared that smallpox eradication was as important as malaria
eradication, musing that the newly advocated programme was perhaps more feasible.
31 World Health Organization, Official Records of the World Health Organization No. 87 (Geneva: WHO, 1958),
508–12.
32 World Health Organization, Official Records of the World Health Organization No. 88 (Geneva: WHO,
1958), 7.
33 Stepan, op. cit. (note 19), 194.
34 WHO, op. cit. (note 31), 511.
35 World Health Organization, ‘Eradication of Smallpox: Draft Resolution Proposed by the Government of the
USSR’ (Geneva: WHO, 1958) at http://www.who.int/iris/handle/10665/109226 (accessed on 20 July 2018).
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Sudan’s representative argued that the WHO had an important and unique international
role to play, in that its structures around the world could deliver a co-ordinating role
that was otherwise impossible to deliver, with its officials operating across borders of
neighbouring countries. There had been major smallpox outbreaks around the world in
1957 and 1958, and memories of the horrors of the disease and the pressures they placed
on public health services were fresh in the delegates’ minds; these were flagged up by
Ecuador’s and Vietnam’s representatives. By contrast, the Australian and Swiss delegates
were more cautious, and they underlined the scale of resources that would be required
for such an expansive programme. They argued that formal WHA clearances for the SEP
needed to be denied until all endemic countries had committed the necessary resources.
Ireland’s and New Zealand’s representatives supported such caution, and submitted
amendments to the draft Soviet resolution asking the WHO DG to collect information on
the financial, administrative and technical implications of the proposed national smallpox
eradication campaigns that would underpin a worldwide programme.36
The WHO DG responded by preparing a report for the next WHO EB meeting in
January 1959 and the WHA that year. This was based on replies to questionnaires sent
out by his office to all member states to assess diversities in smallpox epidemiology,
appetite for more expansive vaccination measures and the level of resources they were
willing to commit. Representatives of fifty member states replied, but not all of these
were from smallpox endemic countries. This forced the WHO DG to declare that some
of his findings were incomplete, especially in relation to available financial resources.
Nevertheless, he used this report to propose that all future national smallpox eradication
campaigns should consist of structures for mass vaccination, health education and disease
surveillance. He also announced that each country would be responsible for its campaigns,
in line with national legal regulations, and they would need integration into general public
health services. The WHO offices in Geneva and the regions would, when requested,
provide expert technical advice and help co-ordinate campaigns across international
borders.37 Dr P.M. Kaul, the WHO Assistant Director-General from India, was tasked
with introducing this report to the WHO EB and WHA. He accepted that there were
considerable financial and organisational problems that needed to be overcome. However,
he also highlighted the positives of creating political synergies, declaring that:
There could be no doubt that such a determined effort was worthwhile and opportune because, if the campaign
were successful, heavy annual expenditure by individual countries would become unnecessary. With adequate
support and co-operation from national health authorities and international assistance, considerable progress
towards eradication could be achieved in a relatively short time.38
The WHO EB meeting of June 1958 created a special account for smallpox eradication
within the WHO HQ, whose managers solicited donations of money and vaccine stocks
from around the world.39 When one looks at the negotiations about SEP budgets, it is
important to recognise that initial financial outlays were primarily mobilised nationally
and regionally.40 For example, the African Conference on Smallpox Eradication hosted
by the WHO regional office for Africa in Brazzaville, Congo, highlighted the importance
of coordinated smallpox eradication services, which involved recruiting and training of
36 WHO, op. cit. (note 31), 263–72.
37 ‘Smallpox Eradication Report by the Director-General’, 28 April 1959, File 849, Box 1, WHO/SEA.
38 World Health Organization, Official Records World Health Organization No. 95 (Geneva: WHO, 1959), 325.
39 ‘Gifts of Smallpox Vaccine EB22.R24’, 14 June 1958, File 1069, Box 599, WHO/SEA.
40 Op. cit. (note 37).
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personnel, vaccination techniques and health education campaigns for target populations.
There was agreement that cross-border work was necessary, since populations and the
causative virus did not respect political maps. Also acknowledged was that African
territories and countries would require material aid from international agencies in order
to prepare vaccination structures for the needs of eradication.41 Similar perspectives
emanated from other regional contexts as well. Over the course of 1958 and 1959, the
WHO regional office for the Eastern Mediterranean (WHO EMRO) deployed a team
composed of an epidemiologist and a laboratory expert to carry out surveys in all
its member states, which reported a range of practical challenges as it advocated the
strengthening of smallpox vaccination services.42 This was akin to activities within South
Asia, reported and carefully considered for its wider relevance at the WHO Inter-Regional
Smallpox Conference hosted by WHO SEARO in New Delhi in November 1960.43
All these investigations underlined the need for good quality, thermostable freeze-dried
vaccine, which, in turn, raised serious questions about and for smallpox endemic countries,
where supplies were incomplete and unreliable.44 The WHO HQ started setting aside
fellowships in response, as well as funds for training courses and the secondment of
consultants, for projects that would strengthen supplies of reliable vaccines and other
SEP goals. A handful of laboratories in developed countries, such as the UK’s Lister
Institute of Preventive Medicine, were identified as sources of such technical assistance
and training facilities.45 The process of distributing fellowships was not straightforward.
Correspondence between Dr Douglas McClean of the Lister Institute and Dr A.M. Payne
of the WHO HQ’s Section of Endemo-epidemic Diseases in August 1958 highlighted
the prolonged and complicated nature of discussions about the need to identify one or
two regional centres responsible for vaccine production and training. The Lister Institute
wished to accommodate no more than one or two fellows from each WHO region,
after difficulties with two applicants from Iraq and Sudan nominated by WHO EMRO.
The Institute, therefore, wished to disallow candidates from ‘countries that lacked the
necessary scientific resources and which would be likely to bring the method of vaccine
production into disrepute’.46 Some months later, a placement request from WHO HQ for
a South Korean veterinary officer responsible for national vaccine production resulted in
further tensions. Professor A.A. Miles, the director of the Lister Institute, questioned the
suitability of receiving candidates from a ‘small country’ and WHO’s inability to send
groups of two or three fellows at a time for training.47 In an effort to change Professor
Miles’s mind, the WHO HQ requested external experts to prepare assessments of the
candidate’s curriculum vitae and Seoul’s vaccine production facilities. As their positive
feedback was relayed back to the Lister Institute, it was also underlined that South
Korea was one of the few countries in the region still affected by smallpox, and that the
41 ‘Report of the African Conference on Smallpox Eradication WHO/Smallpox/11’, 10 August 1960, File 346,
Box 278, WHO/SEA.
42 Op. cit. (note 37).
43 ‘Smallpox Eradication Report by the Director-General’, 19 December 1960, File 849, Box 1, WHO/SEA.
44 Ibid.
45 For example, see letter from Dr A.C. Saenz, medical officer, WHO HQ, to the Commonwealth Serum
Laboratories in Australia, 27 April 1960. File S2-133-1, Box 88, WHO/SEA.
46 Letter from Dr D. McClean, Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine, London, UK, to Dr A.M. Payne, medical
officer, WHO HQ, 5 August 1958, File S2-133-1, Box 88, WHO/SEA.
47 Letter from Professor A.A. Miles, director, Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine, London, UK, to
Dr A.M. Payne, medical officer, WHO HQ, 14 January 1959, File S2-133-1, Box 88, WHO/SEA.
KWWSVZZZFDPEULGJHRUJFRUHWHUPVKWWSVGRLRUJPGK
'RZQORDGHGIURPKWWSVZZZFDPEULGJHRUJFRUH8QLYHUVLW\RI<RUNRQ'HFDWVXEMHFWWRWKH&DPEULGJH&RUHWHUPVRIXVHDYDLODEOHDW
Re-assessing the Foundations: Worldwide Smallpox Eradication, 1957–67 81
production of high-quality vaccine would help both the country and the region to fight
this disease.48 Following further negotiations, the South Korean candidate was offered
the opportunity to hold a WHO fellowship at the Lister Institute from February 1959
onwards.49
In many ways, the WHO HQ negotiators’ stubbornness and the Lister Institute’s
ultimate acquiescence underlines how the WHA’s resolutions supporting smallpox
eradication had created a legally binding agreement that was being deployed internationally
to some effect. These legal devices were used by coalitions of WHO and government
officials to push for the restructuring of national vaccination and disease surveillance
frameworks, even if the impact across and within countries was uneven. Some
national governments responded by launching pilot eradication projects, which, their
representatives argued, were needed to establish the most effective methodologies and
prepare reliable financial estimates of the cost of a wider SEP. Many commentators
regarded South Asian countries, whose governments worked closely with the WHO
SEARO andWHO EMRO, as the most important sites for such investigative drives as they
reported the highest incidence of smallpox.50 The Indian Council of Medical Research set
up a committee in May 1958 to examine the possibility of smallpox eradication, and the
central government accepted its proposal that investigative pilot projects be set up across
the country.51 Between 1960 and 1961, such projects were run in one district of each Indian
state, which provided government officials at all levels of national administration with
first-hand experience of many practical challenges. This work also helped the collection
of the evidence base that justified by the launch of the National SEP in January 1962.52
Similar activities were organised in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), another densely populated
endemic region. Pilot projects were launched in the two districts most affected by smallpox
during the epidemic of 1957 and 1958, that is, Commilla and Faridpur. With 4.4 and 3.2
million inhabitants respectively, the task was difficult and blanket immunisation required
eight months of concerted work. Regarded a success upon completion, this campaign also
provided Pakistan with the evidence base with which to justify and formally launch its
own national smallpox eradication campaign in November 1961.53
As these SEP pilots developed, they helped uncover disparate, ground-level problems
to the programme’s international advocates, and successive WHA meetings considered
the best means of countering these challenges. The thirteenth WHA, held in 1960, saw
the Soviet representative question the accuracy of the epidemiological data presented
in the WHO DG’s report and suggest the immediate development of special surveys
that would allow the collection of more reliable information.54 At the fourteenth WHA,
48 Letter from A.C. Saenz, medical officer, WHO HQ, to Professor A.A. Miles, director, Lister Institute of
Preventive Medicine, London, UK, 23 January 1959, File S2-133-1, Box 88, WHO/SEA.
49 Letter from Professor A.A. Miles, director, Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine, London, UK, to Dr Saenz,
medical officer, WHO HQ, 11 February 1959, File S2-133-1, Box 88, WHO/SEA.
50 For summaries of proposals for pilot projects within WHO regions, see memorandum ‘Smallpox Eradication
Programme: Report to the 33rd Executive Board and 17th World Health Assembly’, File 023, Box 2, WHO/SEA.
51 ‘Planning, Organising and Execution of National Smallpox Eradication Campaign in India’, 13 January 1964,
File 228, Box 48, WHO/SEA.
52 Glycerinated vaccines were used everywhere except in Orissa state, where freeze-dried vaccine donated by
the Netherlands government, and supplied by the WHO HQ and WHO regional office for South East Asia, was
used: ibid.
53 ‘The Planning, Organization and Execution of Smallpox Eradication Campaign in Pakistan’, 6 January 1964,
File 228, Box 48, WHO/SEA.
54 World Health Organization, Official Records World Health Organization No. 103 (Geneva: WHO,1960), 241.
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the Peruvian delegate highlighted financial difficulties and suggested a draft resolution
that would make the WHO DG allocate money for the SEP through the WHO HQ’s
regular budget. Dr W.A. Karunaratne from Ceylon (Sri Lanka), as chair of the meeting,
noted that the WHA had just committed funds for malaria eradication for the next three
years and highlighted concerns that support for the SEP would require additional national
contributions to WHO budgets. This led to a withdrawal of the Peruvian draft resolution,
which kept WHO smallpox eradication budgets at previous levels.55 At the fifteenth
WHA, Thailand’s delegate wondered how more reliable vaccines could be developed
and made generally available.56 The WHO DG reported that five countries had donated
thirty-four million vaccines and that all but 6.5 million had been used.57 The delegate
from Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) queried the claim, complaining that his government
did not receive stocks during an epidemic outbreak in 1961 and therefore had to import
vaccines from France at great expense.58 As this meeting progressed, it became clear
that the lack of good quality vaccine was only one problematic factor. The WHO DG
highlighted the lack of investment in SEP-related administrative structures, underlining
the need for greater international assistance for developing country contexts.59 The Indian
representative argued that the problem was not lack of technical expertise or vaccines,
but an insufficiency of vehicles and refrigeration equipment. Delegates from Sudan and
Pakistan made similar arguments.60 At the sixteenth WHA, the delegate from the United
States proposed that the WHO DG make provision of US$10 million for SEP through the
regular budget. Despite receiving support from several delegates from African nations, the
proposal failed to pass with a majority vote.61
Countries free of smallpox, especially those in Europe, articulated other concerns.
Reference was made to the large sums of money and volumes of staff time being
used for surveillance and quarantine measures, which were considered necessary in a
situation where air travel across continents became faster and more accessible (by 1962,
there were twenty-nine million people travelling by aeroplanes).62 Several smallpox
importations, which caused wider outbreaks, were linked to air travellers arriving in
the United Kingdom, West Germany, Sweden, Poland and Canada in the 1960s. The
Dutch delegate to the 1963 WHA suggested that the WHO HQ should utilise the anxiety
about future outbreaks to rally wide-ranging support for the SEP.63 In December 1964,
the Norwegian authorities were rattled by an outbreak in Sweden and started planning
wide-ranging preventive action. The Director General of Health Services of the Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Social Affairs contacted Dr Chandra Mani, WHO SEARO’s
director, requesting his help to get permission from the Indian government for a three
week visit by a Norwegian academic, who would study clinical aspects of smallpox, in
January 1965.64
55 World Health Organization, Official Records World Health Organization No. 111 (Geneva: WHO,1961), 286.
56 World Health Organization, Official Records World Health Organization No. 119 (Geneva: WHO, 1962), 304.
57 ‘Smallpox Eradication Report by the Director-General’, 12 May 1962, File 849, Box 001, WHO/SEA.
58 WHO, op. cit. (note 56), 305.
59 WHO, op. cit. (note 56), 280–7.
60 WHO, op. cit. (note 56), 301–2.
61 World Health Organization,Official Records of the World Health Organization No. 128 (Geneva:WHO, 1963),
309.
62 ‘International Certificate of Vaccination or Revaccination Against Smallpox’, 23 December 1963, File 228,
Box 048, WHO/SEA.
63 WHO, op. cit. (note 61), 306.
64 Letter from Dr C. Mani, regional director, WHO regional office for South East Asia, New Delhi, to Ministry
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As multiple anxieties about the international spread of smallpox coalesced in the first
half of the 1960s, interest groups within countries came together within bodies like the
WHA to develop a wider SEP. This led to further collaborative research, whose outcomes
would go on to shape future programmes. Between 1960 and 1965, the WHO HQ spent
around US$65 000 supporting different aspects of smallpox research, which covered topics
as diverse as vaccine production, disease epidemiology, applicability of hyper-immune
gamma globulin as a basis for curative treatments, and the variability of the impact of
different variola virus strains. These research activities were multi-sited, developed and
deployed across countries and WHO regions, involving institutions that ranged from
the Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine in the United Kingdom to hospitals across
Madras (Tamil Nadu) state in India and multiple countries in western Africa.65 To assist
in the assessment and communication of findings, as well as the translation of research
into new policy initiatives, the WHO HQ formed a committee of international experts.
This body met in January 1964, discussed the findings of the research commissioned
by WHO offices in partnership with governments, and provided a blueprint for the
intensification of action.66 Their report asked countries to strengthen their structures for
mass immunisation and change vaccination methods, even as it highlighted the problems
caused by the use of ineffective vaccines. The committee’s recommendations received
wide-ranging support and in February 1964, one month after its meeting, Dr A. Saenz
from the WHO HQ’s Virus Unit attended a meeting at the Swiss Paediatric Society to
discuss the viability of using sub-cutaneous and intra-cutaneous vaccination.67 Following
this, the WHA passed Resolution 17.431964 in 1964, which requested the WHO DG to
prepare a further, comprehensive plan for the worldwide smallpox eradication based on
the evidence presented by the Expert Committee.68
The WHO HQ’s response was to announce that it would work with member states
to prepare detailed surveys of conditions in endemic regions; the aim was to develop
a fulsome understanding of challenges faced by national administrations and create
workable solutions. Visits to Afghanistan, Burma, Mali and Nigeria were organised in
late 1964 and early 1965. The shortage of national funds and public health personnel was
presented as the biggest stumbling block, and investigators in Mali noted that smallpox
was just not regarded a priority and was considered less important locally than the
ongoing, USAID-supported measles control programme.69 Similarly, WHO assessors in
Afghanistan noted the lack of national political support for smallpox eradication and raised
serious doubts about local medical officers’ commitment to the programme. Interestingly,
officials in WHO HQ decided to edit out such criticism from draft reports in order
not to jeopardise future efforts at mobilising administrative support for SEP.70 All these
surveys highlighted the need to rally wide-ranging international and national support for
of Health of India, New Delhi, 24 December 1964, File S2-133-1, Box 088, WHO/SEA.
65 ‘Smallpox Research’, 29 November 1966, File 023, Box 2, WHO/SEA.
66 ‘Expert Committee on Smallpox: First Report’, File 228, Box 48, WHO/SEA.
67 Swiss Paediatric Society, ‘Symposium on the Question of Intracutaneous Smallpox Vaccine’, 27 February
1964, File S2-86-1, Box 057, WHO/SEA. This box also contains detailed and wide-ranging correspondence
between WHO offices and the society, where SEP strategies are considered.
68 WHO, Official Records of The World Health Organization No. 136 (Geneva: WHO, 1964), 346–59.
69 ‘Report on a Visit to the Republic of Mali by a Team of Consultants on the WHO Smallpox Eradication
Programme’, c.1965, File 935, Box 155 R, WHO/SEA.
70 See hand-written notes on page 16 of document titled ‘Report on a Visit to Afghanistan by a Team
of Consultants on the WHO Smallpox Eradication Programme’, c.December 1964, File 935, Box 155 R,
WHO/SEA.
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the goal of smallpox eradication. In 1965, smallpox was made the theme of the World
Health Day celebration across WHO frameworks, and President Lyndon Johnson of the
USA publicly expressed his support for SEP. This allowed the USAID and the US CDC,
which had been working on mass measles immunisation in western Africa since the early
1960s, to develop a joint measles and smallpox eradication programme for twenty African
countries. Dr Marcolino Candau, who had been electedWHO’s DG in 1953, negotiated US
government buy-in into these plans, flying to Washington DC to assure US partners about
the organisation’s support.71 Resolution 18.38 followed at the eighteenth WHA in 1965,
which asked the DG to mobilise further bilateral assistance programmes for an expanded,
worldwide SEP.72 A smallpox eradication unit was formed within the WHO HQ to co-
ordinate international activities, and Donald A. Henderson and Isao Arita assisted Candau
in preparing a detailed plan. This argued that SEP would need a budget of US$180 million
and that thirty per cent of this sum would come from international funds. Candau proposed
that at least forty per cent of this would, in turn, come from the WHO’s regular budget,
which would represent a sharing of expenses by all member states.73 Discussions at the
thirty-seventh WHO EB meeting in January 1966 and the nineteenth WHA that May
reveal that while there was unanimity regarding SEP expansion, disagreements remained
about financing. The British delegate to the assembly proposed a US$1 million limit in
spending and suggested programme postponement if this were not possible. Despite this,
support from a collective of African, South American, Scandinavian and eastern European
countries meant that there was a majority WHA vote for an escalation of SEP work.74
South America and the Justification of a Worldwide SEP
Existing institutional, WHO-related histories of the birth, expansion and completion of
the SEP in the Americas highlight the wider influences of an outbreak in New York,
USA, in 1947.75 Linked to an importation of the disease from Mexico, the episode
led to eight deaths and the vaccination of 6.3 million people in one month.76 In
response, Dr Fred Soper, then WHO PAHO’s director and a strong supporter of the
idea of disease eradication, became interested in thermostable freeze-dried smallpox
vaccines produced in Europe.77 According to the WHO HQ’s official history of smallpox
eradication of 1988, this vaccine was considered efficacious for tropical regions across
the Americas, which were seen as sources of variola reservoirs and a public health
threat to smallpox-free countries like the USA.78 In 1949, Soper proposed a smallpox
eradication programme for the two American continents, receiving the support of WHO
71 ‘Extracts from Provisional Minutes EB37/Min/9’, c.January 1966, 27, File 1070, Box 599, WHO/SEA.
72 World Health Organization, Official Records of World Health Organization No. 144 (Geneva: WHO, 1965),
312–14.
73 Out of this, US$2.4 million would come from the WHO HQ’s regular budget, and US$0.2 million would be
provided by the WHO’s Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and WHO PAHO. ‘Smallpox Eradication
Programme’, 28 March 1966, File 849, Box 1, WHO/SEA.
74 World Health Organization,Official Records of the World Health Organization No. 152 (Geneva:WHO, 1966),
258–64, 288–96.
75 Bichat A. Rodrigues, ‘Smallpox Eradication in the Americas’, PAHO Bulletin, IX, 1 (1975), 53–68. Also see,
Fenner et al., op. cit. (note 8), 389–91.
76 Stepan, op. cit. (note 19), 192–93.
77 Fred L. Soper, ‘Rehabilitation of the Eradication Concept in Prevention of Communicable Diseases’, Public
Health Reports, 80, 10 (1965), 855–69.
78 Fenner et al., op. cit. (note 8), 391.
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PAHO’s Executive Committee.79 The thirteenth Pan American Sanitary Conference in
1950 endorsed the proposal and made a relatively modest US$75 000 available for work
in 1952.80 Unpublished papers about this plan and its national iterations shows this
funding being used mainly for the provision of technical advice and equipment for
freeze-dried vaccine production by member states.81 However, academic scholarship has
generally not examined the impact of the WHA resolutions in support of SEP from
1958 and 1959 on the reshaping of international, regional and national work on variola
surveillance and vaccination in South America. These WHA-level developments led to
new negotiations between the WHO HQ, WHO PAHO and member states, as well as
new forms of preventive work and evaluation that involved WHO representation within
several countries. These activities were carefully studied across WHO frameworks, with
these analyses feeding into their engagements with the WHA. As the evidence provided
here shows, the results of this work fed into the explanatory frameworks that justified the
so-called intensification of the SEP over the course of 1967 and 1968.
The great complexity of SEP negotiations within and across specific South American
country contexts is best assessed through unpublished documentation, particularly
comprehensive files that include field reports and related assessments. These, more than
diplomatically oriented published reports or unpublished briefing documents for large
international gatherings, provide detail about disagreements, concerns about problems,
ambitions for reform and complex negotiations on all these issues. All these engagements
were also interconnected with the preparation of evaluations that many WHO officials
hoped would help justify an expansion of international action. Studied carefully, such
historical materials help us properly assess the great variety within – and the intricate
connections between – national and international administrative structures. For example,
detailed paperwork prepared by WHO PAHO and WHO HQ officials working with
certain South American member states after the WHA’s 1958 SEP resolution reveals
qualitative shifts in negotiations, preparation of new proposals for presentation to different
governments and an awareness that national disparities would ensure variations in
reception, activity and impact within and across countries.82
Such shifting arrangements were clearly visible within several South American
governmental contexts. For example, Peru responded to WHO PAHO’s 1950 call for
smallpox eradication almost immediately, starting its programme the same year with some
success in limiting the prevalence of the disease within its territories.83 Based around
plans to vaccinate eighty per cent of the population in five years, the programme was run
up to 1953, with freeze-dried vaccine produced by Michigan State Laboratory in the USA
(sourced and paid for by WHO PAHO), as well as locally produced vaccines produced
with equipment donated by the regional office. Evaluations revealed the country free of
endemic smallpox in 1955 and the work that made this possible was proudly advertised at a
major international meeting held the following year in Lima.84 The Peruvian government
79 PAHO, op. cit. (note 26).
80 ‘Status of the Smallpox Eradication in America 06/07/1964, annexe II’, File 935, Box 155, WHO/SEA.
81 ‘Status of the Smallpox Eradication in the Americas (CSP 15/17)’, 2 September 1958, File 387, Box 150 R,
WHO/SEA.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Antonio de la Fuente, ‘Informe sobre la Campana de Vacunacion Antivariolica Efectuada Durante el Periodo
de Octubre 1950 – Diciembre 1955’, Boletin de La Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana, February 1957, File I B 1,
Box 562, WHO/SEA.
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remained involved in post-SEP launch discussions in 1958, drawing on its expertise.
However, following smallpox importations from Brazil in 1963, the country actively
joined regional SEP efforts.85 Investigations linked the outbreaks to weak rural vaccination
services, which had allowed the development of pockets of unimmunised populations;
the response to the outbreaks resulting from these cases took the shape of new mass
immunisation campaigns, which were launched successfully between 1964 and 1966.86
Venezuela witnessed similar trends. Mass vaccination campaigns encouraged by WHO
PAHO’s 1950 call helped rid the country of smallpox in 1956.87 Although this initially
caused a half-hearted engagement with the SEP of 1958 and 1959, importations from
the Brazilian region of Gran Sabana in June 1962 ensured a more fulsome engagement
with the new WHA-advocated smallpox eradication work; the resulting deployment of
comprehensive vaccination, search and containment campaigns helped bring the situation
under control.88
Different trends existed elsewhere in South America. Bolivia started its mass smallpox
vaccination campaigns in 1958, after an epidemic in the previous year made its
government more amenable to theWHA’s call for SEP.89 This helped mobilise the Servicio
Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Publica, an international agency jointly created by
the Bolivian, North American governments and USAID, and linked to WHO PAHO.90
However, as rural vaccination remained incomplete and inconstant, importations linked to
Brazil kept stoking new outbreaks,91 and this led to a new agreement with WHO PAHO in
1963 that created a new and comprehensive mass immunisation programme.92 Similarly,
Paraguay was assisted by WHO PAHO to run mass vaccination campaigns between 1958
and 1960, leading to the country becoming free of smallpox between 1961 and 1963.93
However, the country reported seven importations from the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso
in 1964 and another such case in 1965.94 A mass vaccination campaign covering around
sixty per cent of the population followed and this enabled the country to avoid further
infections.95 Similar trends were visible in Colombia and, by 1966, WHO PAHO was
using data from this country to emphasise the importance of strong basic health services
to smallpox vaccination after the so-called attack-phase.96 Argentina, South America’s
second largest country, began its organised fight to eradicate smallpox in 1960, in response
85 ‘Status of the Smallpox Eradication in America’, 6 July 1964, File 935, Box 155, WHO/SEA.
86 ‘Status of Smallpox Eradication in the Americas, and Estimated Requirements for the Eradication of Smallpox
in the Americas (CSP17/20 Rev.1 Addendum II)’, 24 September 1966, File 935, Box 155 R, WHO/SEA.
87 ‘Status of the Smallpox Eradication in the Americas (CSP 15/17)’, 2 September 1958, File 387, Box 150 R,
WHO/SEA.
88 ‘An Alastrim Outbreak in the Gran Sabana (State of Bolivar) Venezuela 1962’, File SMEDOC1-1, Box 414,
WHO/SEA.
89 Harald Frederiksen, Nemesio T. Munoz and Alfredo J. Molina, ‘Smallpox Eradication’, Public Health Reports
(1896–1970), 75, 9 (1959), 771–8.
90 Ibid., 771.
91 Fenner et al., op. cit. (note 8), 594.
92 ‘Agreement Between Bolivian Government and PAHO for a Smallpox Eradication Program’, File 446,
Box 151R, WHO/SEA.
93 ‘Status of the Smallpox Eradication in America (CD15/22)’, 6 July 1964, File 935, Box 155, WHO/SEA.
94 ‘Status of Smallpox Eradication in the Americas, and Estimated Requirements for the Eradication of Smallpox
in the Americas (CSP17/20 Rev.1 Addendum II)’, 24 September 1966, File 935, Box 155 R, WHO/SEA.
95 ‘Viruela-Paraguay, 1973’, File 300, Box 151 R, WHO/SEA.
96 ‘Report by the Director-General on Smallpox Eradication, EB37/Min/9:7, Geneva, 1966’, File 1070, Box 599,
WHO/SEA.
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to an outbreak of sixty-five cases.97 Targeted vaccination between 1960 and 1963 covered
about thirty per cent of the national population, while immunisation activities in 1964 and
1965 were concentrated inside provinces bordering Brazil and Paraguay (the latter drive
led to 5 530 000 vaccinations in the provinces of Corrientes, Misiones, Chaco, Formosa
and Salta).98
As an identified source of smallpox importations across other South American countries,
Brazil received significant attention fromWHO PAHO, WHO HQ and the WHA. In 1956,
President Juscelino Kubitschek argued that smallpox was under control in his country,
and declared that diseases like malaria, yaws, worm infestations and tuberculosis were
the government’s greatest priorities.99 A gradual shift in Brazilian government attitudes
started in 1958, after countries like Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay supported the WHA’s
call for SEP. That year, Kubitschek spoke to the Brazilian National Congress, declaring
that smallpox eradication was both necessary and possible.100 Following this, the country
signed up to Resolution VI of the fifth Pan American Sanitary Conference in 1958, which
declared that the eradication of smallpox was a public health necessity for the Americas.101
In the same year, WHO PAHO’s representative in Brazil visited the Institute Oswaldo
Cruz in Rio de Janeiro, and offered financial and technical advisory support necessary for
starting the production of freeze-dried vaccine. In 1959, Dr Jose da Cunha, responsible
for vaccine production within the Institute, was awarded a WHO PAHO fellowship that
enabled him to visit major manufacturing facilities in the USA, the United Kingdom,
Germany and the Netherlands.102 By 1961, the Brazilian government had established a
new National Health Code, which declared that the government would convert disease
control projects into wider eradication programmes as soon as conditions were favourable,
and specifically mentioned the importance of ridding the country of smallpox.103 New
federally financed but locally managed immunisation initiatives followed, which led to the
vaccination of 2 600 000 people in eighteen of twenty-six Brazilian states.104 In January
1962, Brazil’s federal authorities created the National Campaign Against Smallpox
(NCAS), providing its component team with freeze-dried vaccine made in Rio de Janeiro,
Porto Alegre and Pernambuco.105 The stated goal was to vaccinate eighty per cent of the
population in five years, involved some central government officials, but continued to place
greatest responsibility for delivery and evaluation on state governments.106 The results of
this programme were discussed at the third National Health Conference in 1963, where
the importance of smallpox eradication was highlighted.107 Attendees reported financial
challenges at this meeting, which were connected to political instabilities that would go
on to contribute to the military coup of 1964; the federal Ministry of Health underwent
97 ‘Smallpox in Argentina SMALLPOX/WP/17’, 21 July1967, File 229, Box 048, WHO/SEA.
98 Ibid., 1.
99 Hochman, op. cit. (note 22), 239.
100 ‘Topic 23: Status of Smallpox Eradication in the Americas’, XV Pan American Sanitary Conference, San
Juan, Puerto Rico, Pan American Sanitary Organisation, 1958, File I-B-1, Box 562, WHO/SEA.
101 ‘A Variola no Brasil’, File 395, Box 153R, WHO/SEA.
102 ‘Status of the Smallpox Eradication in America’, 6 June 1964, File 936, Box 155, WHO/SEA.
103 Decree No. 49,974-A, 21 January 1961. A copy of the full document is available in ‘Plan to Eradicate
Smallpox in Brazil’, File 939, Box 157 R, WHO/SEA.
104 ‘Report by the Director-General on Smallpox, A13/P&B/14’, 11 April 1960, File 849, Box 001, WHO/SEA.
105 Op. cit. (note 101).
106 ‘Plan to Eradicate Smallpox in Brazil’, File 939, Box 157 R, WHO/SEA.
107 Ministerio da Saude, 3◦ Conferencia Nacional de Saude (Brasilia: Ministerio da Saude, 1963), 109–11.
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almost constant restructuring, which, in turn, undermined political support for smallpox
eradication in 1963.108
As the new Brazilian military government sought international legitimacy, a bigger
and more visible smallpox programme provided new opportunities for such diplomatic
engagement. Brazil, WHO HQ and WHO PAHO came together around a new agreement
in October 1964, which promised provision of further technical and advisory assistance
from Washington DC and Geneva for national eradication initiatives.109 Plans for a new
Brazilian Smallpox Eradication Campaign (SEC) emerged from these developments, as
well as a review of NCAS data, which showed that only three states – Sergipe, Rio
Grande do Norte and Pernambuco – had vaccinated eighty per cent of their population.110
NCAS’s decentralised structures were dispensed with by the new government, which
favoured increased control from within the national capital.111 The Brazilian federal
health minister acknowledged in 1966 that the country was ‘regrettably among the most
important smallpox foci in the world and the most relevant in the American continent’.112
On 22 August 1966, just days before the SEC was to be launched formally, Dr Hector
Acuna, representing WHO PAHO in the country, wrote to Dr Karel Raska, then chief
of the Communicable Disease Division at WHO HQ, highlighting worries about the
lack of administrative and financial capacity within Brazilian states to carry out mass
vaccinations.113 Raska responded by suggesting that separate plans for central and state
governments be prepared, and suggested that precedents from Pakistan be used as
supporting evidence for such an action.114 Acuna’s response was firmly negative and he
underscored the impossibility for proposing separate plans for the states to the country’s
central government, even as he warned against the diplomatic and strategic dangers of
equating the country with Pakistan.115 This ensured that WHO PAHO ended up with a
relatively marginal role, and only three of its medical officers and one statistician received
permission to join the SEC in 1967.116
Such administrative dissonances ensured that smallpox outbreaks continued across
South America, as porous borders allowed infections to spread from one country to
108 Hochman, op. cit. (note 22), 243–44. For detailed assessments of the problems faced by the NCAS, see ‘WHO
Memorandum from CMO/IQ to CMQ/VIR, 31 January 1963, WHA16 Document – Smallpox Eradication’,
File 026, Box 2, WHO/SEA.
109 Decree No. 54,366, 1 October 1964. For WHO and WHO PAHO assessments of the situation, see ‘Status
of Smallpox Eradication in the Americas, and Estimated Requirements for the Eradication of Smallpox in the
Americas. Annex 11’, 24 September 1966. File 935, Box 155, WHO/SEA.
110 Decree No. 59, 153, 31 August 1966, File 939, Box 157 R, WHO/SEA.
111 Op. cit. (note 106). Also see, ‘Agreement between Brazilian Government and PAHO for a National Smallpox
Eradication Programme’, 26 November 1965, File 939, Box 157, WHO/SEA.
112 Hochman, op. cit. (note 22), 245.
113 Letter from Dr Hector Acuna, medical officer, WHO PAHO, Lima, Peru, to Dr Karel Raska, chief of
Communicable Disease, Geneva, 22 August 1966, File IDBRAZIL 0300JKT1, Box 154 R, WHO/SEA.
114 Letter from Dr Stephen Falkland, interim chief SE/HQ, Geneva, to regional director, WHO AMRO/PAHO,
Washington DC, 29 August 1966, File IDBRAZIL 0300JKT1, Box 154 R, WHO/SEA.
115 Letter from Dr Hector Acuna, medical officer, WHO PAHO, Lima, Peru, to Dr Stephen Falkland, chief SE
unit, Geneva, 6 September 1966, File IDBRAZIL 0300JKT1, Box 154 R, WHO/SEA.
116 Letter from Dr Alfredo Bica, chief Communicable Diseases, WHO AMRO/PAHO, Washington DC to
Dr M.G. Candau, WHO DG, Geneva, 8 February 1967, File IDBRAZIL 0300JKT1, Box 154 R, WHO/SEA.
Historians have dealt with the important roles played by informal networks and ‘epistemic communities’, created
over a period of time, on smallpox vaccine research and production associated to the SEP. See, Steven Palmer
and Gilberto Hochman, ‘A Canada–Brazil Network in the Global Eradication of Smallpox’, Canadian Journal
of Public Health, March/April (2010), 113–14, 118. However, as these scholars acknowledge, the connections
between these networks and SEP developed mainly post-intensification of the SEP.
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another. It is, of course, important not to over-estimate WHO PAHO’s power to contribute
to national SEPs across the Americas. When the regional office decided to push SEP
priorities more vigorously in 1964, internal WHO correspondence revealed that it did
not have the necessary resources to make lasting contributions to member states in the
continent. The regional committee, therefore, passed a resolution that year authorising
WHO PAHO’s director to request and accept contributions of money, equipment and
personnel from donors around the world, for redistribution from Washington DC to
different national governments.117 Sufficient resources were mobilised to allow the
regional office to embark on a survey on the smallpox situation in January 1965, which
took three months to complete. The report concluded that the disease remained endemic
in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru, attributing the situation to insufficient
finances, low vaccine quality and supply, and the lack of uniformity and continuity in
vaccination programmes. Weaknesses in basic health services and related surveillance
systems were blamed for the reintroduction of smallpox into Paraguay and Peru, after
their officials had stopped endemic transmission. The continuing challenges in limiting
the spread of the disease in the Amazon area, where tribal populations moved freely across
national borders, was underlined. Significantly, this landmark report, which would go on to
form the regional evidential bulwark for the intensification of smallpox eradication, used
data from the period between 1950 and 1966 to argue that mass vaccination had worked
to drive down disease incidence.118
Despite all these efforts at consolidation, South America continued to report smallpox.
Concerns caused by the confirmation of twenty-one cases in Argentina in 1966 led to
the signing of a new agreement between its government and WHO PAHO in March
1967, which committed the country to the so-called intensified phase of worldwide
smallpox eradication.119 Strikingly, the country joined on its own terms. Although
the WHO HQ and WHO PAHO initially asked that only freeze-dried vaccine be
used, the Argentine government negotiated the deployment of nationally produced,
therefore cheaper, glycerinated vaccine.120 Colombia was considered to be in danger
from importations, causing its government and WHO PAHO to sign an agreement to
intensify SEP efforts in May 1967.121 Peru’s authorities agreed to a similar tie-up that
August.122 WHO PAHO negotiated similar agreements with Paraguay and Ecuador the
same month.123 As new initiatives launched from 1966 onwards helped to bring about
falls in smallpox incidence in South America, these datasets empowered groups of WHO
117 ‘Status of Smallpox Eradication in the Americas, and Estimated Requirements for the Eradication of
Smallpox in the Americas. Addendum II’, 24 September 1966, 3, File 935, Box 155, WHO/SEA.
118 ‘Status of Smallpox Eradication in the Americas and Estimated Requirements for the Eradication of Smallpox
in the Americas, Washington DC, 1966’, in PAHO Document CSP17/20, Rev. 1, English, File 394, Box 152 R,
WHO/SEA.
119 ‘Status of Smallpox Eradication in the Americas, and Estimated Requirements for the Eradication of
Smallpox in the Americas (CSP17/20 Rev.1 Addendum II)’, 24 September 1966, File 935, Box 155 R,
WHO/SEA.
120 See two drafts of ‘Agreement between the Argentinian Government and PAHO for a Smallpox Eradication
Programme’, c.March 1967, File 446 Box 151 R, WHO/SEA.
121 ‘Agreement for a Smallpox Vaccination Program and Epidemiologic Surveillance in Colombia’, 2 May 1967,
File 446, Box 151R, WHO/SEA.
122 ‘Operational Plan for Peru as Part of the Continental Smallpox Eradication Program’, File 446, Box 151R,
WHO/SEA.
123 ‘Acuerdo Para un Programa de Vacunacion Y Vigilancia Epidemiologica en Viruela en el Ecuador’, File 446,
Box 151 R, WHO/SEA.
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Continent 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967*
Africa 16 307 16 823 26 060 24 329 16 863 12 506 16 784 14 127 9 554
Asia 71 309 39 843 53 957 63 616 98 784 43 537 39 145 50 494 50 958
Europe 26 47 24 136 129 – 1 71 3
North America – – – – – – – – –
South America 5 490 7 931 9 026 9 718 7 151 3 398 3 515 3 092 426
Oceania – 1 – – – – – – –
Total→ 93 132 64 645 89 067 97 800 122 927 54 441 59 445 67 784 60 1941
∗ Until 15 July 1967.
∗∗ Consolidated data compiled by WHO from various sources
Source: Smallpox Eradication – Report of a WHO Scientific Group: World Health Organization Technical
Report Series, No. 393 (Geneva: WHO, 1968), 7, Official Publications Room, University of Cambridge Library,
Cambridge, UK.
Table 1: Annual number of smallpox cases by continent, 1959–66.**
officials to make a stronger case for an intensified SEP.124 This comes through powerfully
in the recommendations made in 1968 by the WHO scientific group on smallpox
eradication, which justified intensification by using epidemiological and programmatic
data from 1958 onwards (see Table 1).125
Conclusion
As with all major WHO-supported programmes, the SEP operated at different levels.
While the secretariat of the WHO HQ reported to the WHA and drew up action plans in
consultation with its EB, it could never avoid discussions with governments of member
states about the acceptance of proposals and day-to-day work. In these engagements
with countries, the WHO HQ’s secretariat had to rely on WHO regional offices, which
generally managed negotiations about adaptations of general policy to specific national
legal frameworks and infrastructural conditions. While representatives of the WHO HQ
could request consultations with senior government officials, the daily intricacies of health
governance was almost always left in the hands of WHO technical staff working through
the regional and country offices and their counterparts inside national administration. The
WHO DG could propose ideas and provide suggestions to a regional director, but the
latter also remained answerable to a regional committee and its constituent member states.
In terms of the SEP, this ensured that top-down imposition of policies remained impossible.
Continual negotiations were necessary at all levels of WHO administration before any
124 ‘Report by the Director-General on Smallpox Eradication’, 20 April 1967, File 849, Box 001, WHO/SEA.
Strikingly, the WHO HQ got more involved in vaccine production and quality testing in Latin America once the
SEP’s intensification had received WHA support. This empowered the WHO HQ to work with regional offices
and member states to create new scientific exchanges and work towards strengthening existing connections. An
important article analyses the biases and hostility of Robert J. Wilson, a Canadian scientist involved in a WHO-
supported programme intended to improve Brazilian smallpox vaccine production, towards national laboratories
and production facilities. See, Steven Palmer, Gilberto Hochman and Danieli Arbex, ‘Smallpox Eradication,
Laboratory Visits, and a Touch of Tourism: Travel Notes of a Canadian Scientist in Brazil’, Historia, Ciencias,
Saude – Manguinhos, 17, 3, (2010), 777–90.
125 Smallpox Eradication – Report of a WHO Scientific Group: World Health Organization Technical Report
Series, No. 393 (Geneva: WHO, 1968), 25, Official Publications Room, University of Cambridge Library,
Cambridge, UK.
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administrative shifts could take place, and the situation was complicated by the fact
that these were connected to similar engagements with complex structures of national
governance. Recognising such features in international health administration helps in the
adoption of an approach that de-centres the history of worldwide smallpox eradication,
ensuring it is necessarily wider than focused narratives about the US government and
actors in western Africa and further afield from the mid-1960s onwards. An approach that
accommodates the study of multiple actors and their engagements allows the recovery of a
richer history of the SEP, which can be connected to processes of decolonisation post-1945
and events surrounding the WHA of 1958.
Recognition of these complexities in the design and implementation of international
health has helped us collect, analyse and present a range of previously unused WHO
papers. This material shows us that several pilot programmes around the world and
their many avatars produced epidemiological and administrative data that helped buttress
arguments for increased support for the SEP. Indeed, it could be argued that such
datasets, collected between 1958 and 1967, proved crucial to the primary argument that
variola could be eradicated. A move away from narrow institutional histories, and a
focus on unpublished files dealing with engagements between the WHA, the WHO HQ,
WHO regional offices and its member states, provides a number of fresh perspectives.
Despite programmatic variations, highs and lows within and across regional and national
contexts, this body of information shows that focused mass vaccination programmes did
help engineer major reductions in smallpox incidence in several endemic countries. For
example, Burma (Myanmar) implemented the SEP successfully between 1958 and 1966,
despite political and economic difficulties, with the help of good rural basic health services
and assistance from the WHO regional office for South East Asia and WHO HQ; the
country was confirmed as being free of smallpox in 1966.126 Similarly, several political
formations within the WHO Western Pacific region (like the Federation of Malaysia and
the two sections of Vietnam) and in the WHO EMRO (such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran)
were reported as being largely smallpox-free by 1967, after successful implementation of
their own distinctive SEP campaigns.127 Reports noted dramatic reductions in smallpox
incidence in Africa in 1966 and 1967, including contexts like the Ivory Coast and the
Central African Republic, where local staff had worked to deliver plans co-operatively
developed with international actors like the WHO HQ, WHO regional office for Africa,
USIAD and CDC to interrupt endemic smallpox transmission.128
Such assessments created expansive networks of solidarity between groupings of WHO
and government officials around the globe, who then used this data to signpost strategic
failures, future possibilities and the usefulness of the wider adoption of results from
successful experimentation with vaccination strategies carried out worldwide.129 Such
datasets continually enabled justification of the creation of new SEP structures across
WHO regions.130 For example, in response to arguments about administrative weaknesses,
the WHA andWHOHQ released funds in 1963 that allowed the mirroring of the Smallpox
126 ‘Smallpox Eradication Programme A19/P&B/2’, 28 March 1966, File 849, Box 1, WHO/SEA.
127 ‘The Smallpox Eradication Programme – Preliminary Outlook’, c.1967, File 27, Box 3, WHO/SEA.
128 ‘Provisional Summary of the 12th Meeting, Committee on Programme and Budget, A21/P&B/SR/12’,
20 May 1968, File 849, Box 1, WHO/SEA.
129 Letter from Dr F. Soliman, chief, Public Health Administration (PHA), WHO HQ, Geneva, to Dr S. Falkland,
medical officer, SE Unit, WHO HQ Geneva, 19 November 1966, File 23, Box 2, WHO/SEA.
130 ‘Questions Which Might be Asked by the Board in Connection to item 2.6 of Provisional agenda of EB39’,
c.1966, File 23, Box 2, WHO/SEA.
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Eradication Unit in WHO HQ within WHO regional offices.131 Similarly, when WHO and
government officials working across South Asia insisted in 1964, on the basis of evidence
collected since 1958, that it was important to ensure that work in countries and across
their borders was synchronised (such views had also been advocated from within the
Americas), necessary legal agreements were negotiated and put into place.132 Evidence
drawn from across WHO regions between 1958 and 1966 was also used to make the
argument that the SEP’s future success would depend on an improvement of smallpox
surveillance and reporting structures,133 which was, in turn, linked to concerted efforts
to promote the strengthening of basic health services.134 Negotiations that followed with
national governments did not result in the uniform or lasting acceptance of all ideas
and practices, but references to concrete examples of success since 1958 allowed SEP
advocates to keep its different national chapters on track, as a WHA-backed initiative,
throughout the 1960s.135
Importantly, this contributed to a situation in 1967 where WHO officials – employed
through its regular budget, seconded to the organisation by governments from around the
world or funded by special programme grants – were able to fan out globally to work with
different national chapters of the SEP. As they embarked on their new brief, these workers
were operating in diplomatic and public health spaces created by the projects run between
1958 and 1966 to carry out further investigations, report problems, discuss possible
solutions and develop policy adaptations in response to a multiplicity of political, social,
economic and cultural conditions. Such diverse engagements always required negotiation
at different levels of governance, which was, once again, made possible by administrative
structures created as a direct result of the international action on SEP between 1958 and
1966.136 The importance of the data collected between 1958 and 1966 is also demonstrated
through the deliberations within the Indian Directorate General of Health Services, which
organised a meeting in New Delhi on 22–29 of January 1968 that involved representatives
from all states and union territories.137 Based on its recommendations, the Government of
India decided to renew its commitment to the SEP, and collaborate with the WHO HQ and
regional office, even if senior WHO negotiators continued to worry about the resilience of
these promises.138
To conclude, the use of a more expansive timeline for the SEP allows us to recover
details of complex projects carried out in a variety of geographical contexts that have
generally not received scholarly attention. This, in turn, allows the preparation of more
inclusive and independent histories that do not end up promoting narrow institutional
interests. This approach enables the study of the SEP’s past in its own terms, as a complex
131 ‘Smallpox Eradication EB31’, c.1963, File 23, Box 2, WHO/SEA.
132 ‘Conclusions and Recommendations Arising out of the Technical Discussions held at the 17th Session of the
Regional Committee for South-East Asia’, New Delhi, 28 September 1964, File 849, Box 1, WHO/SEA.
133 Letter from Dr I. Arita, medical officer, SE Unit, WHO HQ, Geneva, to Dr P.M. Kaul, assistant director-
general, WHO HQ Geneva, 22 December 1965, File 23, Box 2, WHO/SEA.
134 Letter from Dr M. Candau, WHO DG, WHO HQ, Geneva, to all WHO regional directors, 15 June 1966,
File 27, Box 3, WHO/SEA.
135 ‘Smallpox Eradication Programme EB41/12’, 11 December 1967, File 1069, Box 599.
136 See, for example, personal letter from Dr N. Maltseva, medical officer, WHO SEARO, New Delhi, to
D.A. Henderson, Chief, Smallpox Eradication, WHOHQ, Geneva, 27 June 1967, File 416, Box 193, WHO/SEA.
137 Memorandum from regional director, WHO SEARO, New Delhi, to D.A. Henderson, chief, Smallpox
Eradication, WHO HQ, Geneva, 5 January 1968, File 416, Box 193, WHO/SEA.
138 Memorandum from D.A. Henderson, chief, Smallpox Eradication, WHO HQ, Geneva, to regional director,
WHO SEARO, New Delhi, 5 February 1968, File 416, Box 193, WHO/SEA.
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programme that involved hundreds of thousands of national and international workers
who struggled together for over two decades to deliver a goal that many had considered
impossible. If history is to ethically inform current and future policy, the methodology used
here can assist the development of more fulsome appreciations of intricate administrative
and political challenges that await international coalitions as they plan campaigns that
have to negotiate wide-ranging disparities that exist on the ground. Critical historical
analysis, at the very minimum, informs those charged with public health leadership that
their work cannot be based on an inflexible, top-down enforcement of narrow sets of ideas
and practices. Rather, detailed historical research points to the centrality of the need to
respect variations in attitudes, as well as a willingness to negotiate with wide-ranging
actors on equal terms. This, in turn, promotes a move away from damaging and artificial
civilisational narratives that often mark institutional histories, where one group of people
is presented as educators who uplift everyone else from a state of scientific ignorance to
one of supposed technical certainty and unanimity.139 Inclusive histories of international
and national governance, like this article, do not consciously privilege some voices over
others, and can help stoke respectful dialogue with the many actors responsible for national
public health policy design and implementation.
139 See, for example Ogden, op. cit. (note 3). For a good write-up on how histories of the SEP influenced choices
and decisions in subsequent eradication programmes, see Ciro de Quadros, ‘The last challenge: the Horn of
Africa’, in Sanjoy Bhattacharya and Sharon Messenger (eds), The Global Eradication of Smallpox (Hyderabad:
Orient BlackSwan, 2010), 103–5.
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